One may wonder why to study ideologies when we refer to the Middle East. After all, don’t these states follow Islam and the Islamic principles? And why are ideologies so important for states` behaviour in international relations since the Quran and Hadith already provides the path for social and political action?[1] But the Middle East has given rise not only to indigenous ideologies shaped on the dominant religion in the region, such as Islamism or pan-Islamism, but also borrowed ideas and concepts from abroad and translated them into a `Made in the Middle East` response to the own regional needs. After all, Pan-Arabism, or pan-Arab nationalism was hardly a Middle East product, with ideas taken from outside the region (Europe) such as secularism, socialism and nationalism based on the European-minded idea of language (as opposed to religion) as the foundation for political expression.[2] [3] [4] [5] We might say that Egyptian Nasser`s calls for the unity of all 22 Arab states in the 20th century are echoing the 19th century romantic and nationalist calls of Ernst Arndt for the German `Fatherland`. The fact that ideologies such as Islamism, pan-Islamism, and Arab nationalism are very present in the Middle East, makes it possible for such ideas and beliefs to impact Middle East states` behaviour in international relations. They did so in Egypt under Nasser, the stronghold of Arab nationalism, on nationalist Sadat`s embracement of Islamism, as much as it did in Khomeini`s Iran, the epicentre of pan-Islamism.
Influenced by socialist principles, Nasser’s Arab nationalism called for the nationalization of foreign-controlled holdings in the country to finance Egypt`s new projects of social and economic development.[6] The 1956 nationalization of the Suez Canal was a turning point, as for the first time since the establishment of the Ottoman Empire, Arab nationalism has triumphed over foreign imperialism.[7] [8] Pan-Arabism echoed the social injustice of other fellow Arabs (Palestinians) in the face of the Israeli state, an issue that sparked a war between Egypt and Israel in 1967.[9] [10] For Nasser, Zionism, the philosophy behind the creation of a Jewish state in the Middle East was an obstacle to the formation of a pan-Arab state as sponsored by pan-Arab nationalism.[11] The war lost to Israel represented the peak of Arab confidence in the ideology of Arab nationalism, but also brought its demise.[12] [13] Ideas such as secular development and modernization, economic and social prosperity, and the government`s responsibility for the welfare of the people have been replaced by humiliation and insecurity in Arab nationalism`s capacity to positively shape the region.[14] This brought Islamism into the equation as many people started to believe that an indigenous religious-rooted ideology can provide what a foreign-inspired secular one could not, prosperity, justice, and a sense of Muslim (not only Arab) pride.[15] [16] [17] [18] In Egypt, Islamism represented an expression of reactive pride once Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, considered that the proud image of Egypt could not be restored once Israel controlled the Sinai Peninsula, captured from Nasser's Egypt in 1967. Using Islamic symbolism (as opposed to secular, socialist) to justify his actions, and religion -Islam- (as opposed to Arab ethnicity) as a tool for political legitimacy, Sadat, once an ardent Arab nationalist on the lines of his predecessor, provided political liberalisation to the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, brought Cairo closer to the liberal United States and away from socialist, Godless Soviet Union, and, under the `land for peace formula`, retook the Sinai Peninsula from Israel and became the first Arab state that normalized relations with the Jewish state in 1979.[19] [20] [21] On the other hand, Islamism became an expression of a revolutionary change in the region, and this lied behind Iran`s behaviour in international relations during the Islamic Republic`s first Supreme Leader, Ruhollah Khomeini.[22] [23] [24] With the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the interest behind the execution of Iran`s foreign policy shifted from nation-state interests such as "political independence and territorial integrity" towards a more globalized approach based on Ruhollah Khomeini's interpretation of the Twelver Shia jurisprudence.[25] Therefore, unworthy nationalist concepts (according to Khomeini) such as ``national interest`` were to be replaced by the notion of worldwide Islamic governance.[26] According to Khomeini, the interest behind the Islamic Republic`s foreign policy is the export of revolution and the establishment of an Islamic world order. Under the foreign policy slogan ``Neither East, nor West, but the Islamic Republic``, Khomeini believed that Islam came as a blessing for all mankind, not limited only to Muslims. Islamic principles would fill an ideological void in an international society dominated by materialism (capitalism) and that had forgone God (communism), and people who would accept these principles would truly embrace salvation.[27] [28] This `ideological-Islamic interest` was translated into the Islamic Republic`s foreign policy determinants of the time.[29] Instead of seeking to consolidate Iran's interest as nation-state (Persian/Iranian nationalism), Tehran would venture on a holy mission to further export the Islamic revolution and to liberate the oppressed people from the subjugation of materialism by embracing the holy virtues of Islam as promoted by the Islamic Republic (pan-Islamism). An example that reinforces the opinion that Iran's foreign policy pursues this religious reasoning is the 1982 Iranian military campaign further on inside secular-nationalist Baathist Iraq after it already liberated the Iranian territory from the invading forces of Saddam Hussein. This justifies exactly the Khomeinist religious mission of exporting the revolution into Iraqi territory that goes beyond just protecting Iranian territorial integrity (what would have been solely a national interest), and ``liberate`` the Shiite majority people from an oppressive, fearless of God, Sunni ruling class.[30] A second example is given by Iranian hostility in its foreign policy toward the Gulf as Tehran believed that the administrative structures of Gulf monarchies and their ties with the United States run counter to Islamic principles.[31]
In international relations, the fall of Arab nationalism and the rise of Islamism/pan-Islamism can be motivated by a cultural shift in the politics of the Middle East, a departure from utopian visions of reshaping the society through dismissing the old order and replace it with a new one (the nationalist discourse of Nasser), to a nativist vision that places the rebirth of a society on embracing its own traditions and authenticity (Islam).[32] The 1979 Iranian Revolution showed the region that religion -Islam- (as opposed to nationalism) provides greater social cohesion and successful political results, especially after Nasser`s nationalism proved the contrary in 1967.[33] This is a revival of a century-long thought. In 1878, Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II put aside the Secular Osmanlilik of the Tanzimat that promoted an equal Ottoman citizenship before law regardless of religion, after years of Ottoman humiliation and loss of territories to the Europeans and embraced an Islamic Osmanlilik which equalled Ottoman identity with Islamic one to revitalize a dying empire.[34] This was possible because of a cultural revolution in the region that put forward the idea that Islam goes well beyond the divine message and represents the main characteristic of a distinct civilization as opposed to science that dominates the European one. For Iran, Khomeini`s religious beliefs influenced the country`s foreign policy decisions, but for most people in the Middle East, it was their religiosity that influenced their leaders’ actions in international relations.[35] For most of them, ``Islam is not only a religion, it is a nationality``.[36]
[1] Benjamin Macqueen, An Introduction to Middle East Politics, Sage Publications Ltd, second edition, 2018, pp. 117-118.
[2] Shahram Akbarzadeh, Kylie Baxter, Middle East Politics and International Relations, Routledge, 2018, p. 84.
[3] Patrizia Manduchi, Arab Nationalism(s): Rise and Decline of an Ideology, Oriente Moderno 97, 2017, p. 13.
[4] Ibidem, pp. 23-25.
[5] Sharam Akbarzadeh, Kylie Baxter, Middle East Politics and International Relations, Routledge, 2018, p. 84.
[6] James L. Gelvin, The Modern Middle East, Oxford University Press (5th edition), 2020, pp. 281-284.
[7] Ibidem, p. 281.
[8] Benjamin Macqueen, An Introduction to Middle East Politics, Sage Publications Ltd, second edition, 2018, pp. 76-80.
[9] Shahram Akbarzadeh, Kylie Baxter, Middle East Politics and International Relations, Routledge, 2018, pp. 85-86.
[10] Benjamin Macqueen, An Introduction to Middle East Politics, Sage Publications Ltd, second edition, 2018, pp. 110-116.
[11] Ibidem, p. 111.
[12] Ibidem, pp. 110-116.
[13] Patrizia Manduchi, Arab Nationalism(s): Rise and Decline of an Ideology, Oriente Moderno 97, 2017, pp. 19-20.
[14] Shahram Akbarzadeh, Kylie Baxter, Middle East Politics and International Relations, Routledge, 2018, p. 84.
[15] Patrizia Manduchi, Arab Nationalism(s): Rise and Decline of an Ideology, Oriente Moderno 97, 2017, pp. 20-22.
[16] Shahram Akbarzadeh, Kylie Baxter, Middle East Politics and International Relations, Routledge, 2018, pp. 87-89.
[17] James L. Gelvin, The Modern Middle East, Oxford University Press (5th edition), 2020, pp. 330-331.
[18] Saeed Rahnema, Radical Islamism and Failed Developmentalism, Third World Quarterly, 2008, Vol. 29, No. 3, Developmental and Cultural Nationalisms (2008), pp. 487-489.
[19] Benjamin Macqueen, An Introduction to Middle East Politics, Sage Publications Ltd, second edition, 2018, pp. 128-129.
[20] Shahram Akbarzadeh, Kylie Baxter, Middle East Politics and International Relations, Routledge, 2018, p. 88.
[21] James L. Gelvin, The Modern Middle East, Oxford University Press (5th edition), 2020, p. 332.
[22] Shahram Akbarzadeh, Kylie Baxter, Middle East Politics and International Relations, Routledge, 2018, p. 88.
[23] Ibidem, p. 91.
[24] Benjamin Macqueen, An Introduction to Middle East Politics, Sage Publications Ltd, second edition, 2018, pp. 130-133.
[25] R.K. Ramazani, Reflections on Iran`s Foreign Policy: Defining the ``National Interests``, p. 214.
[26] Ibidem.
[27] Ibidem, pp. 214-215.
[28] Shahram Akbarzadeh, Kylie Baxter, Middle East Politics and International Relations, Routledge, 2018, pp. 88-89.
[29] Amir Arjomand, After Khomeini, Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 134-135.
[30] R.K. Ramazani, Reflections on Iran`s Foreign Policy: Defining the ``National Interests``, p. 215.
[31] Ibidem, pp. 215-216.
[32] James L. Gelvin, The Modern Middle East, Oxford University Press (5th edition), 2020, pp. 322-323.
[33] Ibidem, pp. 330-331.
[34] Ibidem, pp. 153-154.
[35] Jonathan Fox, Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations, International Studies Review, Autumn, 2001, Vol. 3, No. 3, (Autumn, 2001), pp. 59-63.
[36] James L. Gelvin, The Modern Middle East, Oxford University Press (5th edition), 2020, pp. 153-154.
Bibliography:
Akbarzadeh, Shahram, Kylie Baxter, Middle East Politics and International Relations, Routledge, 2018.
Arjomand, Amir, After Khomeini, Oxford University Press, 2012.
Fox, Jonathan, Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations, International Studies Review, Autumn, 2001, Vol. 3, No. 3, (Autumn, 2001).
Gelvin, L. James, The Modern Middle East, Oxford University Press (5th edition), 2020.
Macqueen, Benjamin, An Introduction to Middle East Politics, Sage Publications Ltd, second edition, 2018.
Manduchi, Patrizia, Arab Nationalism(s): Rise and Decline of an Ideology, Oriente Moderno 97, 2017.
Rahnema, Saeed, Radical Islamism and Failed Developmentalism, Third World Quarterly, 2008, Vol. 29, No. 3, Developmental and Cultural Nationalisms (2008).
Ramazani, R.K., Reflections on Iran`s Foreign Policy: Defining the ``National Interests``.
